Purchasing Health Care Services from Providers with Unknown Altruism by Billy Jack
Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
Purchasing health care services from providers
with unknown altruism
William Jack∗
Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Room ICC 580,
Washington, DC 20057, USA
Received 16 September 2003; received in revised form 26 May 2004; accepted 4 June 2004
Available online 5 November 2004
Abstract
Cost-sharing rules for paying physicians have been advanced as a way of generating incentives
for the provision of quality care, while recognizing their potential negative effects on production
efﬁciency. However, the optimal sharing rate typically depends on the degree to which the physician
acts in the interest of the patient, what we identify as the physician’s altruism. Since the degree of
altruismislikelytovaryacrossphysicians,andtobeprivateinformation,thestandardrulesforsetting
the cost-sharing rate are unlikely to be optimal. This paper derives conditions for the optimal non-
linear cost-sharing mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information about altruism, and shows
how it can sometimes be implemented through a menu of linear cost-sharing schemes. The model can
be used to rationalize the design of the fund-holder system for general practictioners that operated in
the 1990s in the United Kingdom.
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1. Introduction
It is now widely recognized among health economists that in budgeting resources for
health care services, it matters as much how resource ﬂows are implemented as how much
of a resource envelope is available. That is, research has focused increasingly on how to
purchase services, in addition to the standard question of how much health care should be
provided. The latter kind of question can be addressed with tools of cost-beneﬁt and cost-
effectiveness analysis. This paper contributes to the literature on the ﬁrst question: how to
purchase medical care.
Much of the existing literature pertaining to this question has recently been thoroughly
reviewed by Newhouse (2002). A recurring theme in the design of physician and
hospital payment mechanisms is the need to provide incentives for the provision
of quality care without cream-skimming, while also maintaining incentives for cost-
control. Cost-reimbursement is good for the former, while ﬁxed budgets are good
for the latter, but it has proven perennially difﬁcult to achieve both objectives si-
multaneously, except when consumers themselves are good judges of quality and can
induce the delivery of high quality by threatening to switch providers (Ma, 1994;
Glazer and McGuire, 1994).
An important element of a number of models of physician payment mechanisms is the
extent to which providers value the beneﬁts of care that otherwise accrue to patients. For
example, Ellis and McGuire (1986) showed that if a medical care provider cares about net
revenue and patient beneﬁts in the same way that a social planner does (so the physician
is a “perfect agent”), then fully prospective payment is optimal. There is no problem with
under-provision of quality simply because it is assumed that providers care about it as
much as the social planner does. If, on the other hand, providers place a smaller weight on
patient beneﬁts, then under prospective payment they will lean towards under-provision of
quality. This distortion can be corrected by reimbursing some of the incurred costs: since
thereisaone-to-onerelationshipbetweencostsandquality,subsidizingcostsisthesameas
subsidizingquality,andthesocialoptimumcanbeimplemented.Thus,EllisandMcGuire’s
contribution has the ﬂavor of corrective Pigouvian taxation—quality provision imposes a
positive externality on consumers (because their beneﬁts are under-valued by the provider)
and so is subsidized.
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) introduced the idea that there may not be a one-to-
one relationship between costs and quality, so that if the physician places less than full
weight on consumer well-being, the corrective subsidy inherent in Ellis and McGuire’s
cost-sharing rule would not yield the full optimum. In particular, costs depend on both
quality (in the usual way) and effort exerted by the physician. The full optimum could be
implemented by subsidizing quality directly, but only if this is contractible. Subsidizing
costs, however, is not a perfect substitute for subsidizing quality, as it reduces incentives
to exert effort. The size of the subsidy optimally employed depends on the extent to which
the provider values consumer beneﬁts. If the physician places any value on patient beneﬁts,
then a prospective payment will induce optimal cost-reducing effort, and some positive, but
sub-optimal, level of quality. A small shift to cost-reimbursement is welfare improving, as
the positive impact of increased quality is of ﬁrst order, while the negative impact through
higher costs is second order. Intuitively, as the physician values patient well-being more,W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 75
quality choices under prospective payment move towards the social optimum, and the size
of the corrective cost-reimbursement rate falls.1 Just as the Ellis and McGuire model is
reminiscent of Pigou’s (1947) analysis of externalities, Chalkley and Malcomson’s account
can be seen as being in the spirit of the Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) examination of the
second best.
In both papers, the optimal cost-sharing rate (which achieves the ﬁrst best in Ellis
and McGuire, and the second best in Chalkley and Malcomson) depends on the ex-
tent of agency – that is, on the extent to which the provider incorporates patient bene-
ﬁts when making decisions about quality and effort. It is arguable, however, that such
preference parameters are at least as difﬁcult to discern as the quality of services pro-
vided, if not more so. Indeed, it is very likely that providers vary widely in their altru-
ism towards patients, so it would be necessary to pay different providers differently—the
more benevolent having a smaller share of incurred costs reimbursed. There is no
guarantee, however that faced with a menu of cost-sharing schemes designed for the
range of provider types, each type would choose the cost-reimbursement scheme meant
for him.
We employ standard techniques from the optimal regulation literature (Laffont and
Tirole, 1993) to examine the way a purchaser should optimally contract with providers
with heterogeneous and unknown degrees of altruism. These techniques have been used in
thehealtheconomicsliteraturepreviously,butwhenheterogeneityiswithrespecttoproduc-
tivityorcost.Forexample,ChalkleyandMalcomson(2002)usedthetechniquestostudythe
role of cost reimbursement when patients with a given administratively deﬁned condition
(i.e., a given DRG) differ in the severity of their illnesses. In their model, providers were
identical, but there was demand-side heterogeneity in the sense that the severity of patient
conditions within a given diagnostic related group, could differ across providers. Similarly,
Jack (2002) assumed providers differed directly according to a measure of productivity in a
model of the institutional design of a health system when decisions about hospital closures
are included in contract design.
The next section sets up the structure of the model, including the technological
relationship between physician effort, the quality of care, and costs, as well as a de-
scription of the objectives of the purchaser. In Section 3 the ﬁrst best outcome is
illustrated, when provider characteristics and actions are contractible. Section 4 ex-
amines the second best policy when just provider characteristics, but not quality, are
observable, similar to Chalkley and Malcomson’s (1998) analysis. Section 5 presents
what we call the third best—the optimal payment mechanism when neither provider
characteristics nor quality of care are observable. Section 6 presents an illustration of
the use of the model in rationalizing the design of the UK’s fund-holder experiment,
wherein general practices were given the option of adopting fund-holder (high cost-
sharing) status and continuing with the status quo (low cost-sharing). Section 7 brieﬂy
concludes.
1 GlaeserandShleifer(2001)presentamodelthatprovidesamotivationforwhyﬁrmsmightchoosenon-proﬁt
status. Their model is closely related to Chalkley and Malcomson’s in that reducing the ﬁnancial reward to cost
reduction (i.e., having some degree of cost-sharing) reduces incentives to stint on quality.76 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
2. Model set-up
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the technological environment relating physician effort,
quality of services, and ﬁnancial costs, and then specify social objectives that are pursued
by the purchaser.
2.1. Effort, quality, and costs
A health care purchaser (for example, the government) contracts with a population of
medical care providers. Providers can choose the quality, q>0, of care delivered, and can
affect the ﬁnancial cost, C, by exerting effort, e>0. We assume C(q, e)>0 satisﬁes the
convexityassumptionsC1 >0,C11 >0,C2 <0,C22 >0,andC12 <0,wheresubscriptsdenote
partial derivatives. It is helpful to think of C as the cost the provider incurs when buying
inputs (including the labor services of other staff), so that higher quality services cost
more, but effort reduces these costs. Notice that the provider can “reduce costs” by simply
providing a lower quality. There is no heterogeneity in C(·,·) across physicians, so they all
have the same case mix and labor productivity (or else differences in these factors have
been accounted for).2
As well as the ﬁnancial costs of provision, the provider suffers some extra disutility
associatedwithherchoiceofqualityandeffort.Usually,wethinkofthisasjustthepersonal
costs of effort that do not show up in purchased inputs, what Laffont and Tirole (1993) for
examplehavedenotedψ(e),whereψ(·)ispositive,increasing,andstrictlyconvex.However,
in this paper, we admit the possibility that providers care about the quality of the services
theyprovide.Itissuggestedthattheyderivesomedirectbeneﬁtθϕ(q)fromprovidingquality
q. θ ∈[0, 1]⊂R+ parameterizes the strength of a provider’s preference for quality, and
ϕ(·)ispositive,increasing,andweaklyconcave.Thus,thenetdisutilityofprovidingquality
q and exerting effort e is:




to patients), she might not value it in the same way as consumers. That is, ϕ(·) might not
necessarily measure the beneﬁt of care to consumers. The second, and more consequential
reason is that, while the provider values quality, she does not value cost savings in a similar
way. Because, the ﬁnancial costs of service delivery are borne by consumers through taxes,
cost savings beneﬁt patients, but the physician does not recognize these beneﬁts when
choosing the level and quality of medical care. This aspect of the formulation is consistent
with much of the literature on physician objectives, as surveyed for example by McGuire
(2000),althoughwerecognizethat,asMcGuirenotes(page521–22),thereissomeempirical
2 Othermodelsintheliterature(MaandMcGuire,1997;McGuire,2000)formulatethequalityeffortbywriting
quality as a function of effort and other inputs z, e.g., q(z, e). If the prices of other inputs are ﬁxed, this function
can be inverted to yield C(q, e)a sa b o v e .W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 77
evidence suggesting that physicians respond also to the ﬁnancial costs borne by consumers
(Eisenberg, 1986).3
2.2. Social objectives
The purchaser cares about consumer and provider utility (i.e., consumer and producer
surplus). Net consumer utility is gross beneﬁts from quality, S(q), increasing and concave,
less the ﬁnancial costs of paying for services. Following the standard literature, we assume
theproviderisreimburseditsﬁnancialcostsc,andlettbethetransfer(ifany)totheprovider
in excess of these costs. Thus, the gross transfer received by the provider is t+c. The
consumer, however, must forgo an amount (1+λ)(t+c), where λ>0 is the marginal excess
burden of taxation. Thus, net consumer utility, or consumer surplus, is S(q)−(1+λ)(t+c).
The provider’s net utility is u=t−γ, which is decomposed into net proﬁt plus beneﬁts
from quality,
u = t − γ = t − ψ + θφ ≡ π + θφ.
Utilityisdecomposedinthisfashionbecause,followingHammond(1987)andChalkley
andMalcomson(1998),wedonotwishtoincludethedirectbeneﬁtsderivedbytheprovider
in social welfare. That is, the purchaser’s objective function is:
W = S(q) − (1 + λ)(t + c) + t − ψ = S(q) − (1 + λ)(ψ + c) − λπ. (2)
Leaving proﬁts with the provider is costly, simply because it costs money to transfer
resources to them from consumers. A provider of type θ will agree to sign a contract only
if her net utility is non-negative, u≥0. This in turn means that the purchaser must ensure
that π≥−θφ.4
Itisinstructivetonotetheconsequencesofincludingthealtruisticcomponentofprovider
utility in social welfare. The welfare function then becomes:
W+ = S(q) − (1 + λ)(t + c) + t − γ = S(q) − (1 + λ)(γ + c) − λu.
Leaving utility rents to providers is again costly. If in both cases providers can be kept
to their reservation utility levels, then the only difference between the formulations is that
the quality of care optimally purchased under W+ (and the health care budget allocated
to providers) will be greater than that purchased under W. In both cases, the participation
constraint is u≥0, and even in the third best, when this cannot be made to bind for all
types of provider (i.e., for all θ), the qualitative features of the optimal contract, such as the
3 We note, however that in the model of this paper, all costs ﬁnanced by consumers are channelled through the
tax system, so it is arguable that providers would be much less responsive to increases in them than if they were
paid directly by consumers at the point of service.
4 It might be necessary in practice to add the constraint that t>0, since, otherwise the provider would be
required to pay the purchaser for the privilege of working.78 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
direction of distortions to budgets and quality, are unaffected by the inclusion of altruistic
beneﬁts in the welfare function.
3. The ﬁrst best
If a purchaser could write a contract based on quality and cost, and if it knew the type




S(q) − (1 + λ)(ψ(e) + C(q,e,θ)) + λθφ(q),
with associated ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution:
S (q) − [(1 + λ)Cq − λθφ (q)] = 0, (3)
and
−(ψ (e) + Ce) = 0. (4)
Denote the optimal values by q*(θ) and e*(θ). Quality should be expanded until the
marginalbeneﬁttoconsumersisequaltothemarginalcosttheybear(Eq.(3)).Themarginal
cost of quality borne by consumers is composed of a gross marginal payment to cover
additional input expenses (1+λ)Cq, offset by the marginal saving on distortionary costs
because providers are effectively partially paid in kind, λθϕ  (q). Provider effort should be
exerted to equate the marginal disutility, ψ  (e), with the marginal cost savings, −Ce (Eq.
(4)).
To examine how the ﬁrst best solution varies with θ, write Eqs. (3) and (4) as g(q, e,
θ)=0andh(q, e)=0, respectively. The second order condition for a maximum, which is
assumedtobesatisﬁed,requiresinpartthat∆=g1h2 −g2h1 >0.Optimalqualityandeffort















Ash1 ispositiveandh2 isnegative,qualityandeffortbothincreasewithθ attheﬁrstbest.
These two effects mean that at the optimum, the variation of input expenditures c*(θ) and
the optimal transfer to the provider t*(θ) with θ is not determined without further structural
assumptions. The net utility earned is identically zero for all provider types, u*(θ)=0.
4. The second best: non-contractible quality and effort
Supposethepurchaserattemptstoimplementtheﬁrstbestoptimumbygivingaprovider
of type θ a budget c* (θ) with which to provide services, and a transfer or salary t*(θ), toW. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 79
compensateherforhereffortcosts.5 Ifqualityandeffortchoicesarenotdirectlyobservable,
then this transfer will in general not yield the ﬁrst best outcome. In particular, given any
transfer c, as long as she is willing to participate, the provider will choose quality and effort
to solve the following problem:
min
q,e
γ(q,e,θ) s.t. C(q,e) = c. (5)
Let ˆ q(c,θ)and ˆ e(c,θ)betheprovider’soptimalchoices(assumedunique),whichsatisfy:
−θφ  + µCq = 0 (6)
and
ψ  + µCe = 0 (7)
for some non-negative Lagrange multiplier µ(c, θ). The convexity assumptions on C, ϕ,
and ψ imply that ˆ q and ˆ e are increasing in θ. We further make the following assumptions


















These assumptions ensure that indifference curves in (c, t)-space are downward sloping
and convex. The ﬁrst pair of assumptions say that a higher budget leads to higher quality,
but crowds out some effort. The second pair represent a kind of decreasing returns assump-
tion. Further increases in a budget lead to diminishing quality improvements, and smaller
crowding out effects on the supply of effort. Finally, the third pair say that the higher is θ,
the larger the effect on quality and effort of incremental budget resources. The ﬁrst order
effects of provider type and budgets are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Eqs. (6) and (7) are the same as the ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrst best optimum if and
only if the budget is the right size (so that µ(c, θ)=1), and if the provider values quality the
same way as the purchaser, up to an additive constant: that is, only if θϕ(q)=S(q)+k, for
someconstantk.Toseethis,notefrom(6)thatifcissettoensureµ=1,theproviderchooses
quality to satisfy Cq =θϕ (q). Substituting this into (3), we ﬁnd that the social optimum is
5 These resources could, of course, be transferred jointly, for instance as a total budget b=t+c. We assume
that the purchaser could then monitor expenditures on inputs and declare the contract void if these expenditures
did not match c.80 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
Fig. 1. Bold lines represent effort-quality pairs yielding constant ﬁnancial costs, and thin lines represent constant
disutilityofprovisionlines.(i)Morealtruisticprovidersputinmoreeffortandproducehigherqualityforthesame
budget. (ii) A larger budget leads to higher quality and lower effort.
attained only if θϕ(q)=S(q)+k. Ellis and McGuire (1986) referred to a provider with such
a coincidence of preferences as a “perfect agent”.
If the provider is not a perfect agent for the purchaser (the interesting case), what is the
best the purchaser can do? This is essentially the question addressed by Ellis and McGuire
(1986) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998). The purchaser’s decision variables are now
thebudgetcandtransfertmadetotheprovider.Weassumeinthissectionthatthepurchaser
knows the provider’s type, θ.
For a given budget c, denote the minimized disutility in (5) by ˆ γ(c, θ), and let:
ˆ γ(c,θ) = ˆ ψ(c,θ) − θˆ φ(c,θ).
Thatis, ˆ ψ(c,θ)isthecostofeffortoptimallyincurredbytheproviderwhengivenabudgetc,
and θˆ φ(c, θ) is the direct beneﬁt from quality optimally derived. The net disutility function,
ˆ γ, has the following properties, which are implied by our underlying assumptions:
ˆ γ2 = γ3 =− φ(ˆ q(c,θ) < 0
ˆ γ1 =− µ(c,θ) < 0
.
In addition, we make the following single crossing assumption:6
Assumption 2.
ˆ γ12 < 0 (8)












ψ  dˆ e
dc
− θφ  dˆ q
dc

= ψ  d2ˆ e
dcdθ




− φ  dˆ q
dc
− θφ  d2ˆ q
dcdθ




Under our maintained assumptions, all the terms in this expression are negative, except the last. Note that if ϕ is
linear, then the single crossing property holds automatically.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 81
Similarly,deﬁnethesocialbeneﬁtassociatedwithaθ-typeproviderprovidingserviceswith
a budget c as:
ˆ S(c,θ) ≡ S(ˆ q(c,θ)).
Because, it knows θ and can thereby infer the provider’s quality and effort choices, the
purchaser can also infer disutility costs, ˆ γ (c, θ). And because leaving rents to providers is
inefﬁcient, the purchaser sets t= ˆ γ(c, θ). Redeﬁne welfare from (2) in terms of c and θ as:
ˆ W(c,θ) = ˆ S(c,θ) − (1 + λ)(ˆ ψ(c,θ) + c) + λθˆ φ(c,θ). (9)
From our assumptions on providers’ supply of effort and quality, we are guaranteed that




ˆ W12 > 0.
Since the level of effort (and hence, its marginal cost) is higher when θ is larger, this
assumption is consistent with extra budget resources leading to a larger reduction in effort
costs amongst more benevolent physicians.8
The optimal budget to give the provider then satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
ˆ W1(c,θ) = ˆ S1(c,θ) − (1 + λ)(ˆ ψ1(c,θ) + 1) + λθˆ φ1(c,θ) = 0. (10)
7 Concavity of ˆ W is assured, since:























8 Formally, a sufﬁcient condition for ˆ W12 >0is ˆ S12 >0 and ˆ ψ12 <0. Differentiating (but omitting function
arguments):




+ S  d2ˆ q
dθdc
and




+ ψ  d2ˆ e
dθdc
Given our assumptions on the functions ˆ q and ˆ e, ˆ ψ12 <0 as required. On the other hand, the ﬁrst term in the
expression for ˆ S12 is negative, while the second is positive. Assumption 3 is satisﬁed as long as the second term
dominates the ﬁrst.82 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
Denote the solution to this condition by ˆ c(θ). Under Assumption 3, the optimal budget is




= ˆ γ1ˆ c (θ) + ˆ γ2 < 0.
Thus, a more benevolent provider is given a larger budget because she makes it go further,
but she is given a smaller salary as the value of the payment she receives in kind (derived
from quality) is larger.
4.1. Implementation through cost-sharing
The second best optimum is a budget ˆ c(θ) and transfer ˆ t(θ). The provider is not thought
of choosing c in this interpretation—she just takes c as ﬁxed, and decides how much effort
toexert.However,thepurchasercanimplementthesameoutcomeusingacost-sharingrule.
To this end, suppose the provider is able to choose the size of her budget, and that when she
chooses c she receives a transfer ˆ T(c). Let us write the provider’s net utility as:
ˆ u = (c,θ) = ˆ T(c) − ˆ γ1(c,θ).
She simply chooses c to maximize this expression, thereby, choosing c to satisfy:
ˆ T (c) = ˆ γ1(c,θ),
whichisnegative.Evaluatetherighthandsideofthisexpressionatthesecondbestoptimum
budget, ˆ c(θ), and denote its absolute value by:
ˆ τ(θ) =−ˆ γ1(ˆ c(θ),θ).
If the provider is reimbursed costs c, and given an additional transfer:
ˆ T(c) = ˆ α(θ) − ˆ τ(θ)c
for some constant ˆ α(θ), she will indeed choose the desired budget, ˆ c(θ). Now just choose
ˆ α(θ) to satisfy,
ˆ α(θ) − ˆ τ(θ)ˆ c(θ) = ˆ γ(ˆ c(θ),θ),
and the provider will earn zero net utility from the contract. Finally, the budget reimburse-
mentandextratransfercomponentscanbecombinedtoyieldagrosspaymenttotheprovider
of:
ˆ P(c) = ˆ T(c) + c = α(θ) + (1 − ˆ τ(θ))c ≡ α(θ) + ˆ σ(θ)c.
That is, the gross transfer to the provider is a ﬁxed sum plus a share, ˆ σ(θ)=1− ˆ τ(θ), of
realizedcosts.Theparametersofthesesharingschemesvaryacrossproviders.Inparticular,
ˆ σ (θ) =− ˆ τ (θ) = ˆ γ11ˆ c (θ) + ˆ γ12 < 0, (11)
so a more altruistic provider has a smaller share of realized costs reimbursed. This is
consistent with the Chalkley and Malcomson result alluded to in the introduction—theW. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 83
more the provider acts in the interests of the patient, the less should be the subsidy to costs
(and hence, indirectly, quality).
As a special case, suppose S(q)=ϕ(q) and θ =1, so the physician cares about quality in
the same way as the purchaser, and cares about it with full weight, so is a perfect agent in
the sense of Ellis and McGuire (1986). Condition (10) for the optimal budget reduces to:
ˆ S1(c,1) = ˆ ψ1(c,1) + 1,
and the cost-sharing rate that implements the optimum is,
ˆ τ(1) = ˆ S1(c,1) − ˆ ψ1(c,1) = 1.
A perfect agent should thus be given a budget and be made a residual claimant for all
incurred cost savings. On the other hand, if θ  =1 (note that we have not precluded the case
θ >1), then it is straightforward to show:






which is increasing in θ. The more altruistic an agent is, the higher the rate of cost-sharing
should be. Conversely, the less the physician cares about patient beneﬁts (the lower is θ),
the more costs should be covered at the margin by the payer.
5. Third best contracts
Wecontinuetoprecludecontractingonqualityandeffort,butnowintroducetherealistic
assumption that provider type is not contractible, that is, that budgets and transfers cannot
dependonθ.Thisdoesnotmeanthatitwillbeimpossibletoinduceproviderswithdifferent
typestoprovideservicesatdifferentﬁnancialcost,butitdoesimposecostsonthepurchaser
from inducing such separation.
To see what might go wrong when contracts cannot be based on provider type, suppose
themenuofsecondbestcontractsdeﬁnedintheprevioussectionispresentedtophysicians.
There is now no guarantee that a given provider will choose the contract that is meant for
her. This is most easily seen in Fig. 2, where we have depicted the optimal cost-sharing
contracts for two different types of provider, with types θ− and θ+, where θ− <θ+. The
vertical axis in this ﬁgure measures the transfer in excess of ﬁnancial costs made to the
provider. There are two transfer schedules, T(c, θ−) and T(c, θ+), meant for the θ− and θ+
types, respectively. Also shown are provider indifference curves, along which net utility is
zero for each type. The second best budgets and transfers/salaries are at points X− and X+,
respectively.However,itisclearthat,giventhechoice,θ+-typeproviderswillopttobepaid
under the T(c, θ−) schedule and not the one designed for them, T(c, θ+).
Toinvestigatetheeffectthatunobservabilityofθhasonthekindsofcost-sharingcontracts
that should be employed, we search for the optimal direct mechanism (t(θ), c(θ)), which
represents a menu of transfer/budget pairs. A provider is asked to announce her type, and
then given a budget c(θ) to spend on inputs, and a transfer t(θ) to compensate her for84 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
Fig. 2. The second best optimal contracts leave providers with zero net utility, and give a larger budget c,b u t
smaller transfer t, to more benevolent providers.
disutility costs. However, there is no guarantee that this transfer will not exceed the net
disutility suffered by the provider, that is, she might earn positive rents.
Indeed, let
ρ(θ,θ ) = t(θ ) − ˆ γ(c(θ ),θ),
betherentearnedbyaprovideroftypeθwhensheannounceshertypetobeθ .W einvokethe
revelationprinciple(Myerson,1979)andconﬁneourselvestodirectmechanismsthatinduce
truthful reporting, that is, incentive compatible mechanisms. It is well understood (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993) that the truth telling constraint, which implies ρ2(θ, θ)=0, reduces to the
monotonicity condition:9
c (θ) ≥ 0. (12)
9 Following the exposition of Laffont and Tirole (page 63), let θ >θ . A mechanism (t(θ), c(θ)) induces truthful
reporting if:
t(θ) − ˆ γ(c(θ),θ) ≥ t(θ ) − ˆ γ(c(θ ),θ)
and
t(θ ) − ˆ γ(c(θ ),θ ) ≥ t(θ) − ˆ γ(c(θ),θ ).
Add these two inequalities, eliminate the transfers and divide by (θ −θ ), yielding:
ˆ γ2(c(θ ),θ) ≥ ˆ γ2(c(θ),θ),
which in turn implies:
ˆ γ12c (θ) ≤ 0,
as θ >θ . From (8) we infer the monotonicity condition, c (θ)≥0.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 85
Net utility earned by the provider under an incentive compatible mechanism is:
u(θ) = ρ(θ,θ) = t(θ) − ˆ γ(c(θ),θ),
which varies with θ according to:
u (θ) = ρ1(θ,θ) + ρ2(θ,θ) = ρ1(θ,θ) (byincentivecompatibility)
=−ˆ γ2(c(θ),θ) = ˆ φ(c(θ),θ) ≥ 0. (13)
That is, under an incentive compatible mechanism, higher-θ providers, earn higher net
utility.
Social welfare is the expected value of (9). We assume θ is distributed on [θ0, θ1] with
densityfunctionf,andcdfF.Thewelfareattainedunderanincentivecompatiblemechanism












[ ˆ W(c(θ),θ) − λu(θ)]f(θ)dθ, (14)
where ˆ W(c(θ), θ) is deﬁned in (9).
Use (13) to express the utility of provider θ as:
u(θ) = u(θ0) +
 θ
θ0
ˆ φ(c,θ )dθ . (15)
From (14), provider utility should be as low as possible at the optimum, and since it
must be increasing in θ, the purchaser should set u(θ0)=0. We use the standard trick of
substituting (15) into (14) and integrating by parts to eliminate the dependence of welfare




[ ˆ W(c,θ) − λH(θ)ˆ φ(c,θ)]f(θ)dθ,
where H(θ)=(1−F(θ))/f(θ). The purchaser’s problem is to maximize this expression by
choosing a cost function c(θ), subject to the monotonicity condition (12). Differentiating
the integrand pointwise, we ﬁnd,
ˆ W1(c,θ) − λH(θ)ˆ φ1(c,θ) = 0. (16)
Eventhoughwehaveassumed ˆ W tobeconcave,theconcavityof ˆ φmeansthatthesolution
to (16), which we denote ˜ c(θ), need not be the pointwise maximizer of the integrand in ˜ W.
Additionally, the solution to (16) is not necessarily non-decreasing. Both of these problems
can be addressed by making suitable assumptions regarding the distribution of the altruism
parameter.However,ifitisassumedthatφ(q)≡S(q)forallq(so ˆ φ(c,θ)=ˆ S(c,θ)),thatH(·)is86 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
non-increasing in θ, and that there are sufﬁciently many physicians with the lowest possible
value of altruism, then ˜ c(θ) will indeed solve the purchaser’s maximization problem.10
Proposition 1. Suppose ϕ(q)≡S(q) for all q. If f(θ0)≥λ/(1+λθ0) and H(·) is non-
increasing in θ, then ˜ c(θ) solves the purchaser’s maximization problem.





ˆ W12 − λ(H ˆ φ1 + H ˆ φ12
ˆ W11 − λH ˆ φ11

.
If H  ≤0, the numerator is positive. With ˆ φ= ˆ S, the denominator is ˆ S11(1 + λ(θ − H)) −
(1 + λ)ˆ ψ11. Since ˆ S is concave and ˆ ψ is convex, if 1+λ(θ −H(θ))≥0, the denominator is
negative(andthesecondorderconditionissatisﬁed).IfHisnon-increasing,thenasufﬁcient






In particular, if θ0 =0, then as long as the ﬁrst two conditions are met and f(0)≥λ,˜ c(θ)
is the solution to the purchaser’s problem. Comparison with (10) shows that the budget
assigned to a provider of type θ is distorted away from its second best level, due to the extra
termλH(θ)ˆ φ1 in(16),exceptatθ =θ1.Indeed,theexpenditurebudgetsforallproviderswith
θ <θ1 are restricted below their second best optimal level, that is, ˜ c(θ)<ˆ c(θ). The intuition
for this result is illustrated in Fig. 3. The second best contracts are not implementable, since
the θ+ provider will choose contract X−. The optimal pair of contracts (Y−, Y+) involves an
increasedpaymenttotheθ+ provider(tocontractY+),whonowearnsarent,andareduction
in the budget of the θ+ provider (to contract Y−).




ˆ φ(˜ c(θ ),θ )dθ ,
which is increasing in θ. The transfer, t, in excess of the budget must satisfy,
˜ t(θ) = ˜ u(θ) + ˆ γ(˜ c(θ),θ). (18)
10 To interpret the optimality condition (16), rewrite it as:
[ˆ S1(c,θ) − ˆ ψ1(c,θ) + λ(θˆ φ1(c,θ) − ˆ ψ1(c,θ))]f(θ) = (1 + λ)f(θ) + λ(1 − F(θ)ˆ φ1(c,θ). (17)
A marginal increase in the budget of θ-type providers (of whom there are f(θ)) yields a direct margial beneﬁt to
consumers of ˆ S1, and a beneﬁt to providers that is counted in social welfare of −ˆ ψ1. In addition, the purchaser
can guarantee these providers the same utility by reducing the transfer they receive by the reduction in disutility,
−ˆ γ1 = θˆ φ1 − ˆ ψ1 thereby saving λ(θˆ φ1 − ˆ ψ1) in distortionary costs. On the other hand, the extra budget for all
θ-types imposes a direct social cost of (1+λ)f(θ). Finally, the small increase in the budget raises the rent of each
θ-type provider by ˆ φ1, and by (15), of all (1−F(θ)) providers with higher θ’s. The social cost of this increased
rent is the last term on the right hand side of (17).W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 87
Fig. 3. Third best contracts distort the budget of low-θ providers downwards, and permit high-θ providers to earn
a positive rent.
While under the second best contractual arrangement providers with higher values of
θ received unambiguously lower salary transfers, that is ˆ t  (θ)<0, at the third best opti-
mum there is a tension between paying more benevolent providers less, because they are
“cheaper,”andpayingthemmore,becauseoftheincentiveconstraint.Thatis,differentiating
(18) yields:
˜ t (θ) = ˜ u (θ) 	
>0





Under the conditions of the previous section, ˜ c(θ) is strictly increasing in θ, so deﬁne the
inverse function ˜ θ(c), which gives the type of provider that should, at the optimum, choose
budget c. The net transfer ˜ t(θ) can now be written as a function of the observed cost,
˜ T(c) = ˜ t(˜ θ(c)) = ˜ u(˜ θ(c)) + ˆ γ(c, ˜ θ(c)).
Using the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that,
˜ T (c) = (˜ u  + ˆ γ2)˜ θ (c) + ˆ γ1 = ˆ γ1 < 0. (20)
On the other hand, it is not possible in this model to establish the convexity properties
of the transfer as a function of cost, since
˜ T  (c) = ˆ γ11(c, ˜ θ(c)) + ˆ γ12(c, ˜ θ(c))˜ θ (c),
and the ﬁrst term is positive, while the second is negative.88 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
If ˜ T   >0,so ˜ T is convex, then it is possible to implement the optimal contract as a menu
of linear contracts of the form,
˜ T(c;θ) = ˜ α(θ) − ˜ τ(θ)c, (21)
where ˜ α(θ)isaﬁxedsalarycomponent,increasinginθ,and ˜ τ(θ)isacost-sharingcomponent,
also increasing, in θ (corresponding to the behavior of ˆ τ(θ) in condition (11) in Section
4.1). Providers are given a choice among the continuum of contracts (˜ α(θ), ˜ τ(θ)), being
paid a lump-sum ˜ α(θ) and having a share ˜ σ(θ) = 1 − ˜ τ(θ) of expenses reimbursed. More
altruistic providers choose contracts with higher ﬁxed salaries and have a lower share of
costs reimbursed. The intuition is that reimbursing costs is bad for cost-control incentives,
butnecessarytoinducequalityprovision.Since,ittakeslessofanincentivetoinducequality
provisionfrommorealtruisticproviders,theircost-controlincentivescanbestrengthenedby
having them bear a larger share of costs, while not compromising quality too much. Having
to pay more of the incurred costs of medical care means that, to ensure participation, they
must be paid a larger salary component.
If ˜ T is not convex, it is not possible to implement the third best using a menu of linear
contracts. However, it may be possible to approximate the third best with such a menu.
Let ˜ TH(c) be the function that describes the lower boundary of the convex hull of the
set of points {(c, t): t≥ ˜ T(c)}, where ˜ T is the third best optimum transfer function. By
(20), ˜ TH (c) is downward sloping, and by deﬁnition it is convex, and so can be im-
plemented with a menu of linear contracts of the form ˜ αH (θ)− ˜ τH(θ). An example is
shown in Fig. 4.
Fig.4. Inthisexample,thethirdbesttransferfunction ˜ T(c)isdecreasingbutnotconvex,socannotbeimplemented
with a menu of linear contracts. The convex function ˜ TH(c) approximates the third best, and can be implemented
by offering providers a choice of payment schedules as shown.W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 89
6. An example and extensions
The general idea that agents can be given optimal incentives by allowing them to choose
from a menu of linear incentive schemes is familiar from the regulation and procurement
literature (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). An example in the sphere of medical care is the fund-
holder experiment in the UK (Glennerster et al., 1994; Dusheiko et al., 2004), itself part
of the creation of an “internal market” in the 1990s that aimed to increase the efﬁciency
of resource use in the health sector. The reforms aimed broadly at improving the quality
of services provided, while maintaining incentives for cost-control. Public ﬁnancing of
medical care was maintained, but the way providers were paid was changed so as to pursue
these quality and cost goals. The objectives assumed of the purchaser of services in this
paper correspond closely to these policy goals.
Between 1991 and 1999, larger general practices in the UK were afforded the option of
becoming fund-holders, or continuing with the status quo. GPs who adopted fund-holder
status were given a budget from which to ﬁnance certain non-emergency hospital-delivered
secondary care. Unused budgetary resources could be used by fund-holders to purchase
new equipment, and to even purchase additional services from themselves (Dusheiko et al.,
2004). While perhaps not equivalent to a dollar of personal consumption, a dollar saved
arguably thus contributed non-negligibly to net physician income. General practices that
opted to continue under the existing arrangements neither bore the costs of secondary care
directly, nor appropriated the savings that might have arisen from economizing on such
care. By 1997, over half of the UK population was registered with a fund-holding general
practice (Dusheiko et al., 2004).
Because GPs were given the option to become fund-holders, any empirical attempt to
examine the effect of fund-holder status on referrals and costs must account for the obvious
selection issues. For example, Dusheiko et al. (2004) assume physicians are heterogeneous
withrespecttoatasteparameter,θ.Thosewithhigherθ’sadmitmorepatientsforsecondary
care, because they perceive the gross beneﬁt of admission to be higher—this means θ has
similarbehavioralimplicationsasitwouldifitwereinterpretedasameasureofaltruism.In
the analysis of Dusheiko et al. (2004), physicians with higher values of θ are also less likely
to choose fund-holder status, because of a ﬁxed cost associated with such status (e.g., “...




authors ﬁnd that accounting for selection effects, fund-holder status was associated with
reduced admission rates and lower secondary care expenditures.
While the fund-holder experiment presented a unique opportunity to test the respon-
siveness of physicians to alternative ﬁnancial incentives, it was clearly not an exercise in
randomization. The model of this paper provides a normative rationale for why the policy
allowedphysicianstochoosetheﬁnancialconstraintsunderwhichtheyoperated:unobserv-
able physician heterogeneity implies that optimal cost-sharing schemes that trade off rent
extraction against effort incentives are typically non-linear, and they can be implemented
(sometimes only approximately) by offering a menu of options. The two options in the
UK system, which, using the notation of (21), correspond to cost-sharing rates of ˜ τ =0%90 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
(non-fund-holder) and ˜ τ =100% (fund-holder, with a correspondingly larger budget), rep-
resent such an approximation. This approximation could conceivably have been ﬁne-tuned
by introducing a third status, say with an intermediate budget and 50% cost-sharing.
This illustrative example of course does not deﬁnitively conﬁrm the theoretical ideas
explored in this paper, although it is indicative. The model supports the idea that GPs were
giventhechoiceofadoptingfund-holderstatusnotbecauseitwasthoughtthatsomeofthem
should face weaker cost-control incentives on the margin, but rather that it would have been
tooexpensive(intermsoftherentspaidtoother,morealtruistic,physicians)toprovidesuch
incentives to all GPs. That is, if the government had mandated universal fund-holder status,
the budget allocations to general practices needed to induce participation by all (especially
low-θ) physicians would have been inefﬁciently large.
A number of alternative explanations for including cost-sharing components in physi-
cian payment can be considered. For example, we have assumed an environment in which
physicians face no uncertainty regarding costs and/or case loads. However, in a stochastic
setting there is a role for cost-sharing to balance incentives against risk exposure (Gaynor,
1994),evenifphysiciansarehomogeneouslyaltruistic.11,12 Ontheotherhand,whilemoral
hazard rationalizes the use of cost-sharing mechanisms, it does not provide a good moti-
vation for allowing physicians to sort amongst alternative contracts. If physicians differ in
a relevant characteristic, for example, risk aversion, then such sorting, effected by offering
a menu of options, could be efﬁcient. We would expect to see more risk averse physicians
being paid on (or close to) a fee-for-service basis, while less risk averse providers would be
paid by (or close to) capitation. It is plausible that exhibited risk aversion could be linked to
wealth, and that an empirical strategy would be to investigate the degree to which special-
ists sort themselves by wealth across cost-sharing regimes. It is less clear that altruism is
empirically correlated with wealth, so that the absence of a correlation between the degree
of cost-sharing chosen and wealth would, abstracting from obvious endogeneity problems,
constitute evidence consistent with our theory.
Our model of physician heterogeneity can also be extended to understand patterns of
physician compensation in markets with non-government payers, such as in the private
insurance market in the US. The objectives of insurance plans (the buyers of physi-
cian services) would need to be speciﬁed differently to our representation of welfare,
since the plans would have some proﬁt motive. Even not-for-proﬁt plans would be ﬁ-
nanced in part by prices (premiums) paid by individuals, and not solely through taxes
11 The particular form of an optimal payment policy under conditions of moral hazard depends on the precise
way in which physician effort affects costs. In a general principal-agent setting, a deductible policy (one with
100% cost-sharing up to a limit, and zero percent cost-sharing thereafter) is optimal if the agent can inﬂuence the
ex ante probability of a costly event (e.g., an accident), but not the loss associated with that event (e.g., the extent
of damage). On the other hand, if the agent can affect the ex post size of the loss, some kind of marginal (perhaps
non-linear) cost-sharing is optimal. Since, it is likely that GPs have more control over the cost of treating patients
who present with given conditions than reducing the chance that such conditions are developed, optimal payment
mechanisms that traded off risk-protection against cost control incentives would tend to exhibit cost-sharing
between zero and 100 percent.
12 There was some degree of risk protection for GPs in the UK scheme, as fund-holders were only required
to ﬁnance certain secondary care procedures known as “chargeable electives”. Payments for “non-chargeable
electives” and emergency care were made by the geographically deﬁned health authorities (Dusheiko et al., 2004).W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93 91
as in the current model. However, substituting a revenue function R(q) for the surplus
function S(q) would lead to qualitatively similar predictions for paying heterogeneous
physicians.
A second modelling choice arises when there is competition among plans, so that a
plan is not a monopsonist in the physician labor market. One approach would be to as-
sume that plans competitively bid for the labor services of physicians by offering employ-
ment contracts stipulating a budget (c) and compensation (t), and to ﬁnd an equilibrium
that satisﬁes zero proﬁt and incentive compatibility constraints in the spirit of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976). In her survey, Glied (2000) notes the wide variety of methods for
paying physicians (salary, fee-for-service, etc.), based partly on research by Gold et al.
(1995) who survey managed care plans. The model in this paper, and the alternatives
suggested above, suggest that different methods of payment can be an efﬁcient way of
sorting physicians according to underlying (and possibly unobserved) heterogeneity (their
altruism, risk aversion, or ethical standards). What is less obvious is whether this sorting
should be across plans, in which case each health plan would pay its physicians on a single
schedule (e.g., salaried physicians in HMOs versus fee-for-service providers in indemnity
plans),orifeachplanwouldhaveamixofreimbursementschedulesfromwhichphysicians
could choose, but with less heterogeneity across plans. This line of enquiry awaits further
research.
Finally, our model can be seen, in the spirit of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) as a ra-
tionalization for allowing plans to voluntarily choose non-proﬁt status. The model clearly
doesnotaddresstherevenuegeneratingactivitiesofnon-proﬁts(pricing,fundraising,etc.).
However,sinceaproﬁtstaxcanbeinterpretedasataxonrevenuesplusasubsidytocosts(at
the marginal tax rate), a plan that opts for non-proﬁt status effectively bears the full burden
of its ﬁnancial costs, whereas the government shares some of the costs of a plan that selects
for-proﬁt status. The selection operates then at the plan level, and we might expect plans
that have a direct concern for quality, as suggested by Newhouse (1970) adopt non-proﬁt
status.
7. Conclusions
Physician payment mechanisms need to generate incentives for the potentially conﬂict-
ing goals of quality provision and production efﬁciency, at reasonable ﬁnancial cost to the
payer. Subsidizing costs can be a useful way to induce higher quality, as Ellis and McGuire
(1986) pointed out. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) observed that subsidizing costs can
compromise production efﬁciency (discourage cost-reducing effort), thereby mitigating the
role of cost-sharing to some degree. In both models, the appropriate cost-sharing rate de-
pends on the extent to which consumer beneﬁts enter the provider’s utility function. This
paper contributes to this literature by relaxing the assumption that the purchaser of care
knows the extent of provider altruism. The variation in altruism across the population of
providers is likely to be large, and the ability of a purchaser to base payment incentives
directly on such information, were it available, would surely be limited. If contracts cannot
be tailored explicitly to provider characteristics, the purchaser needs to design an incentive
mechanismthatinducesproviderstorevealtheirtypes.Theresultis,ingeneral,anon-linear92 W. Jack / Journal of Health Economics 24 (2005) 73–93
scheme that relates payment to incurred costs. If this payment function is convex, it can
be implemented by allowing physicians to choose from a menu of linear payment sched-
ules, each characterized by a different cost-sharing parameter. In our model, however, it is
not guaranteed that the optimal transfer function will be convex, in which case it can be
approximated by such a menu of linear contracts.
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